Abstract The paper deals with a zero-sum differential game in which the dynamical system is described by a fractional differential equation with the Caputo derivative of an order α ∈ (0, 1). The goal of the first (second) player is to minimize (maximize) the value of a given quality index. The main contribution of the paper is the proof of the fact that this differential game has the value, i.e., the lower and upper game values coincide. The proof is based on the appropriate approximation of the game by a zero-sum differential game in which the dynamical system is described by a first order functional differential equation of a retarded type. It is shown that the values of the approximating differential games have a limit, and this limit is the value of the original game. Moreover, the optimal players' feedback control procedures are proposed that use the optimally controlled approximating system as a guide.
Introduction
The paper is devoted to the development of the theory of zero-sum differential games (see, e.g., [3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 18, 25, 28, 40] and the references therein) to the case when a motion of a dynamical system is described a fractional differential equation. For the basics of fractional calculus, theory of fractional differential equations and their applications, the reader is referred to [8, 20, 35, 39, 41] .
Despite the fact that a great number of various control problems in fractional order systems are intensively studied nowadays, only a few works deal with differential games in such systems (see [1, 7, 34, 38] and the references therein). Furthermore, in these works, only some special classes of linear pursuit-evasion differential games are investigated.
In the paper, we follow the game-theoretical approach [22, 23, 25, 28, 37, 43, 44] and consider a quite general formulation of a zero-sum differential game in a fractional order system. We suppose that a motion of the system is described by a non-linear fractional differential equation with the Caputo derivative of an order α ∈ (0, 1). The game is considered on a finite time interval. The goal of the first (second) player is to minimize (maximize) the value of a given quality index evaluating the system's motion. The main contribution of the paper is the proof of the fact that the considered differential game has the value, i.e., the lower and upper values of the game coincide.
Due to non-local structure of fractional order derivatives, fractional differential equations are used for describing dynamical systems with the memory effects of a special kind. It makes these equations close to functional differential equations (see, e.g., [5, 16, 21] ). In particular, the Riemann-Liouville fractional integral of the order (1−α) of the solution to the considered fractional differential equation is, by the definition, the solution to the corresponding first order functional differential equation of a neutral type. It allows us to introduce a differential game in this neutral type system and study it instead of the original game. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no results that can be applied for investigating the obtained differential game. Namely, in [2, 14, 15, 29, 30, 33, 36] , only some special classes of neutral type systems are considered, and, in [45] , the game is considered in the classes of players' programm (open-loop) strategies.
Nevertheless, following [12] , based on the finite-difference Grünwald-Letnikov formulas for calculation of fractional derivatives (see, e.g., [41, p. 386] ), one can approximate the obtained differential game in the first order neutral type system by a differential game in a first order retarded type system. Let us note that differential games in dynamical systems described by functional differential equations of a retarded type are quite well studied (see, e.g., [25, 28, 37] and the references therein), especially in comparison with differential games in neutral type systems. Thus, applying the results of [26, 27, 28] , we derive that the approximating differential game has the value, and, moreover, this value is achieved in the appropriate classes of players' positional (closedloop) strategies.
Further, based on the ideas from [24] (see also [30] ), to establish a connection between the original and approximating differential games, we consider the players' feedback control procedures that use the optimally controlled approximating system as a guide (see, e.g., [25, § 8.2] ). It allows us to prove that the values of the approximating games have a limit, and this limit coincides with the value of the original game. The key point here is the mutual aiming procedure between the original and approximating systems [12] that provides the desired proximity between the systems' motions. Moreover, in particular, we obtain that the proposed players' control procedures with a guide guarantee the game value with a given accuracy, and, in this sense, they can be called optimal.
Let us note also that differential games give a natural formalization of control problems under conditions of unknown disturbances (see, e.g., [22, 23, 25, 44] ). In some other frameworks, such control problems in fractional order systems are studied, e.g., in [19, 42] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the notations, recall the definitions of fractional order integrals and derivatives, and give some of their properties. In Sect. 3, the considered differential game in a fractional order system is described, and, in particular, the notion of the game value is defined. The corresponding differential game in a first order neutral type system is discussed in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we propose an approximation of this game by a differential game in a first order retarded type system. In Sect. 6, the mutual aiming procedure between the original and approximating systems and the optimal players' control procedures with a guide are described, the limit of the values of the approximating differential game is introduced. In Sect. 7, we prove that the original differential game has the value. Concluding remarks are given in Sect. 8.
Notations and Definitions
Let t 0 , ϑ ∈ R, t 0 < ϑ, and n ∈ N be fixed. Let R n be the n-dimensional Euclidian space with the scalar product ·, · and the norm · . By L ∞ ([t 0 , ϑ], R n ), we denote the space of essentially bounded (Lebesgue) measurable functions x : [t 0 , ϑ] → R n with the norm
Let C([t 0 , ϑ], R n ) be the space of continuous functions x : [t 0 , ϑ] → R n with the uniform norm, which is also denoted by · ∞ . Let Lip 0 ([t 0 , ϑ], R n ) be the set of functions x(·) ∈ C([t 0 , ϑ], R n ) that are Lipschitz continuous and satisfy the equality x(t 0 ) = 0. For L ≥ 0, we denote by Lip
Let α ∈ (0, 1) be fixed. For a function x : [t 0 , ϑ] → R n , the RiemannLiouville (R.-L.) fractional integral of the order α and the R.-L. fractional derivative of the order α are respectively defined by
where Γ is the gamma function. For the properties of the fractional order integrals and derivatives, the reader is referred to [8, 20, 35, 39, 41] . In this section, we shortly describe those properties that are used in the paper. The details can also be found in [11, 12] .
, the following inequality holds:
Further, let us consider the function y(t) = (I 1−α x)(t), t ∈ [t 0 , ϑ]. Then, according to (1), we haveẏ(t) = (D α x)(t) for almost every t ∈ [t 0 , ϑ], where we denoteẏ(t) = dy(t)/dt; the inclusion
and the following representation formula holds:
Finally, for a function x : [t 0 , ϑ] → R n , the Caputo (C.) fractional derivative of the order α is defined by
In particular, if x(t 0 ) = 0, then the R.-L. and C. fractional derivatives coincide.
Differential Game with Fractional Dynamics

Fractional Order System
We consider a dynamical system which motion is described by the following fractional differential equation with the C. derivative of the order α :
Here t is the time; x(t) is the value of the state vector at the time t; u(t) and v(t) are respectively the values of the control vectors of the first and second players at the time t; t 0 and ϑ are called the initial and terminal times; the sets U ⊂ R r and V ⊂ R s are compact, r, s ∈ N. We suppose that the function f : 
(A.3) There exists c > 0 such that
for any t ∈ [t 0 , ϑ], x ∈ R n , u ∈ U, and v ∈ V. (A.4) The saddle point condition in a small game [25, p. 8] Note that these conditions are quite typical for the differential games theory with first order dynamics (see, e.g., [25, p. 7] ).
Admissible Positions of the System
By a position of system (5), we mean a pair (t, w(·)) consisting of a time t ∈ [t 0 , ϑ] and a function w(·) ∈ C([t 0 , t], R n ), which is treated as a motion history on the interval [t 0 , t]. The set of the positions (t, w(·)) is denoted by G. A position (t, w(·)) ∈ G is called admissible if the relations below are valid:
where R 0 > 0 is a fixed constant, c is the constant from condition (A.3). According to the definition given in Sect. 2, the second inclusion in (6) means that there exists a function
The set of the admissible positions is denoted by G * .
Proposition 1
The set G * is not empty, and there exist R 1 > 0, M 1 > 0, and H 1 > 0 such that, for any (t, w(·)) ∈ G * , the inequalities below are valid:
Proof Let t ∈ [t 0 , ϑ] and w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ). Let us consider the function w(τ ) = w 0 , τ ∈ [t 0 , t]. According to (1) and (4), we have (
Hence, the inclusion (t, w(·)) ∈ G * is valid, and, therefore, the set G * is not empty.
Further, let us define
where c is the constant from (A.3), E α is the Mittag-Leffler function (see, e.g., [41, (1. 90)]), and H is the constant from (2). Let (t, w(·)) ∈ G * . Then, due to (6) and the results given in Sect. 2, we have
for any τ ∈ [t 0 , t], and, therefore,
From this inequality, applying the fractional version of Bellman-Gronwall lemma (see, e.g., [8, Lemma 6.19] and also [11, Lemma 1.1]), we conclude w(τ ) ≤ R 1 , τ ∈ [t 0 , t]. Thus, according to (6), we have
Finally, by the choice of H, we derive
The proposition is proved.
Let (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * and t * ∈ [t * , ϑ]. By admissible control realizations (controls) of the first and second players on the interval [t * , t * ), we mean measurable functions u : [t * , t * ) → U and v : [t * , t * ) → V, respectively. The sets of the admissible control realizations of the players are denoted by U(t * , t * ) and V(t * , t * ). Following [17] (see also [11] ), by a motion of system (5) generated from the initial position (t * , w * (·)) by players' control realizations u(·) ∈ U(t * , t * ) and v(·) ∈ V(t * , t * ), we mean a function
and, together with u(·) and v(·), satisfies Eq. (5) for almost every t ∈ [t * , t * ]. For such a motion x(·) and a time t ∈ [t 0 , t * ], we denote by (t, x t (·)) the corresponding position of system (5), i.e.,
, and v(·) ∈ V(t * , t * ). The existence and uniqueness of the corresponding motion x(·) of system (5) can be proved by the standard scheme (see, e.g., [8, (7), and the integral equation
Further, for t ∈ [t 0 , t * ], the inclusion (t, x t (·)) ∈ G * follows from initial condition (7) and the inclusion (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * . For t ∈ (t * , t * ], the inclusion (t, x t (·)) ∈ G * is valid due to (A.3). The proposition is proved.
From Propositions 1 and 2 we derive the following result.
. Let x(·) be the motion of system (5) generated from the initial position (t * , w * (·)) by players' control realizations u(·) ∈ U(t * , t * ) and v(·) ∈ V(t * , t * ). Then the following inequalities hold:
where the constants R 1 and H 1 are taken from Proposition 1.
Let us note also the following property of motions of system (5), which follows directly from Proposition 2. Let (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , t * ∈ [t * , ϑ], and let x(·) be the motion generated from (t * , w * (·)) by u(·) ∈ U(t * , t * ) and v(·) ∈ V(t * , t * ). Further, let t * * ∈ [t * , ϑ], and let x * (·) be the motion generated from (t * , x t * (·)) by u * (·) ∈ U(t * , t * * ) and v * (·) ∈ V(t * , t * * ). Then x * (·) can be considered as the motion generated from (t * , w * (·)) by the realizations
In particular, this property allows us to consider step-by-step feedback control procedures for constructing players' control realizations (see Sect. 6).
Quality Index
Let x(·) be the motion of system (5) generated from an initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * by players' control realizations u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ). Let quality of this motion be evaluated by the index
We suppose that the function σ :
(A.5) The function σ is continuous.
For dynamical system (5) and quality index (9), we consider a zero-sum differential game in which the first player aims to minimize the value of the quality index, and the second player aims to maximize it.
Non-anticipative Strategies and the Game Value
To define the value of the differential game (5), (9), we consider non-anticipative strategies of the players (see, e.g., [3, Ch. VIII] and the references therein) and introduce the lower and upper values of the game. Note that, in another terminology, such strategies are called quasi-strategies (see, e.g., [44, p. 24] ) or progressive strategies (see, e.g., [9, § XI.4]).
Let (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * be an initial position. By a non-anticipative strategy of the first player, we mean a function α : V(t * , ϑ) → U(t * , ϑ) with the following property. For any t * ∈ [t * , ϑ] and any second player's control realizations
The lower value of the differential game (5), (9) is defined by
where γ is the value of quality index (9) that corresponds to the motion x(·) generated from (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * by the second player's control realization v(·) and the first player's control realization
Similarly, a function β : U(t * , ϑ) → V(t * , ϑ) is a non-anticipative strategy of the second player if, for any t * ∈ [t * , ϑ] and any u(·), u
. The upper value of the game is defined by
If the lower and upper game values coincide for any initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , then we say that the game has the value
The goal of the paper is to prove that the differential game (5), (9) has the value, and, for any initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , construct the players' feedback control procedures that guarantee the game value ρ(t * , w * (·)) with a given accuracy ζ > 0. These results are formulated in Theorem 1 (see Sect. 7). The proof of this theorem follows the scheme from [30, Theorem 2] and is based on the appropriate approximation of the differential game (5), (9) . Before describing this approximation, in the next section, we rewrite the considered differential game in another form.
Differential Game in a Neutral Type System
Let x(·) be the motion of system (5) generated from an initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * by players' control realizations u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ). Let us consider the function
Since
, then, according to the results given in Sect. 2, we have
Substituting these equalities into Eq. (5), we obtain that, instead of the original differential game (5), (9), one can consider the differential game for the dynamical systeṁ
under the initial condition
and the quality index
Furthermore, due to (3), one can rewrite Eq. (13) as follows:
Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (16) depends explicitly on the history of the derivativeẏ(τ ) for τ ∈ [t 0 , t]. Therefore, in the terminology of the theory of functional differential equations (see, e.g., [5, 16, 21] ), Eq. (16) is a functional differential equation of a neutral type. To the best of our knowledge, in the theory of differential games in neutral type systems (see the references in Introduction), there are no results that can be directly applied for studying the game (13), (15) , and, therefore, the original game (5), (9) too. However, as it is shown in the next section, the game (13), (15) can be approximated by a differential game in a retarded type system.
Approximating Differential Game
Following [12, Sect. 6], let us approximate in relations (13) , (15) 
the symbol [τ ] means the integer part of τ ≥ 0, and
are the binomial coefficients. In this section, we study the differential game obtained after this approximation.
Approximating Dynamical System and Quality Index
Let us fix a vector w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ) and a sufficiently small value of the parameter h > 0. Note that, in what follows, the vector w 0 corresponds to an initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * of system (5) such that w 0 = w * (t 0 ). Taking into account the above, we consider the following zero-sum differential game, determined by these two parameters w 0 and h. We introduce the approximating dynamical system which motion is described by the differential equatioṅ
and the approximating quality index
Here y(t) is the value of the state vector; p(t) and q(t) are respectively the values of the control vectors of the first and second players. The first player minimizes the value of quality index (19), the second player maximizes it. Note that, according to (17) , at a time t ∈ [t 0 , ϑ], the right-hand side of Eq. (18), (19) , we mainly use the constructions and results from [26, 27, 28] .
Remark 1 Let us note that, even in a simple case when original quality index (9) is terminal, i.e., γ = µ(x(ϑ)) for a function µ : R n → R, the corresponding approximating quality index γ w0,h = µ(w 0 + h α−1 (∆ 1−α h y)(ϑ)) is still nonterminal, since, according to (17) , it depends on the values
Taking into account (11) and (12) , by a position of approximating system (18), we mean a pair (t, r(·)) ∈ G such that r(t 0 ) = 0. The set of such positions is denoted by G 0 . This set is considered with the metric (see, e.g., [27] and also [28, p. 25 
where (t, r(·)), (t ′ , r ′ (·)) ∈ G 0 , and
By the right-hand side of Eqs. (18), (19) , let us define the functions
where (t, r(·)) ∈ G 0 , p ∈ U, q ∈ V, and (ϑ, y(·)) ∈ G 0 . Directly from properties (A.1)-(A.5) of the functions f and σ it follows that these functions f w0,h and σ w0,h satisfy the following conditions: (B.1) For any h > 0, the functions f w0,h and σ w0,h are continuous uniformly in w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ). (B.2) For any h > 0 and any R ≥ 0, there exists λ h > 0 such that, for any w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ), the inequality
is valid for any (t, r(·)), (t, r ′ (·)) ∈ G 0 satisfying r(·) ∞ ≤ R, r ′ (·) ∞ ≤ R and any p ∈ U, q ∈ V. for any (t, r(·)) ∈ G 0 and s ∈ R n .
According to (14) , if an initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * of original system (5) is given, we define the corresponding initial position (t * , r * (·)) ∈ G 0 of approximating system (18) as follows:
Due to Proposition 1 and the results given in Sect. 2, the function r * (·) satisfies the inclusion r * (·) ∈ Lip 0 M1 ([t 0 , t * ], R n ). Taking this into account, we call a position (t, r(·)) ∈ G 0 of approximating system (18) admissible if
where c h = max{M 1 , c h }, and c h is the constant from condition (B.3). The set of such admissible positions is denoted by G 0 h . Note that this set is independent on the parameter w 0 .
Let (t * , r * (·)) ∈ G 0 h and t * ∈ [t * , ϑ]. As in Sect. 3.2, by admissible control realizations of the players in the approximating game (18) , (19) , we mean functions p(·) ∈ U(t * , t * ) and q(·) ∈ V(t * , t * ). Due to properties (B.1)-(B.3), from the initial position (t * , r * (·)), such control realizations p(·) and q(·) uniquely generate the motion of approximating system (18) that is the function y(·) ∈ Lip 0 ([t 0 , t * ], R n ) satisfying the initial condition y(t) = r * (t), t ∈ [t 0 , t * ], and, together with p(·) and q(·), satisfying Eq. (18) for almost every t ∈ [t * , t * ]. Let us note the following properties of the set G 0 h . Firstly, for any (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , the inclusion (t * , r * (·)) ∈ G 0 h is valid for the function r * (·) defined by (20) . Secondly, for the motion y(·) of approximating system (18) generated from (t * , r * (·)) ∈ G 0 h by p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ), the inclusion (t, y t (·)) ∈ G 0 h holds for any t ∈ [t * , ϑ], where, according to (8), we denote y t (τ ) = y(τ ), τ ∈ [t 0 , t]. Finally, the set G 0 h is a compact subset of G 0 . Following the the scheme from [12, Lemma 2] and taking into account that the constant R 1 in Proposition 1 does not depend on an initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , one can prove the result below.
Proposition 3 There exists L 1 > 0 such that the following statement holds. Let (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * be an initial position of original system (5). Let us consider approximating system (18) for w 0 = w * (t 0 ), any h > 0, and under the initial position (t * , r * (·)) defined by (20) . Then the inclusion y(·) ∈ Lip 0 L1 ([t 0 , ϑ], R n ) is valid for any motion y(·) of the approximating system generated from (t * , r * (·)) by p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ).
The Value of the Approximating Game
Let w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ) and h > 0 be fixed. Similarly to Sect. 3.4, in the approximating differential game (18) , (19) , one can consider non-anticipative strategies of the players and introduce the lower and upper game values, denoted respectively by ρ (p) w0,h (t * , r * (·)) and ρ (q) w0,h (t * , r * (·)), (t * , r * (·)) ∈ G 0 h . From the results of [26, 27, 28 ] (see also [15] ) it follows that, under conditions (B.1)-(B.4), the approximating game has the value
w0,h (t * , r * (·)), (t * , r * (·)) ∈ G 0 h , and, furthermore, this value can be guaranteed by the players if they use the positional strategies, described in the next section.
Optimal Positional Strategies
Let w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ) and h > 0 be fixed. In the approximating differential game (5), (9) , by the positional strategies P w0,h and Q w0,h of the players, we mean arbitrary functions
where ε is the accuracy parameter.
Let (t * , r * (·)) ∈ G 0 h , ε > 0, and let
be a partition of the interval [t * , ϑ]. The triple {P w0,h , ε, ∆} is called a control law of the first player. This law forms in the approximating system a piecewise constant control realization p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) by the following step-by-step feedback rule:
where y τ1 (·) = r * (·). Thus, from the initial position (t * , r * (·)), the control law of the first player {P w0,h , ε, ∆} together with a control realization of the second player q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) uniquely generate the motion y(·) of the approximating system and, therefore, determine the value γ w0,h of approximating quality index (19) . Similarly, we consider the control law of the second player {Q w0,h , ε, ∆}, which forms a piecewise constant control realization q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) as follows:
From the initial position (t * , r * (·)), the control law {Q w0,h , ε, ∆} together with p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) uniquely generate the motion y(·) of the approximating system and determine the value γ w0,h of approximating quality index (19) . By the scheme from [26, Theorem 1] (see also [28, Theorem 17 .1]), one can prove the following lemma (see [15] for a related technique).
Lemma 1 For any w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ) and any h > 0, in the approximating differential game (18), (19) , there exist the players' optimal positional strategies P 0 w0,h and Q 0 w0,h that are optimal uniformly in (t * , r * (·)) ∈ G 0 h and w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ). Namely, for any h > 0 and any ζ > 0, one can choose
, and let ∆ be a partition (21) with the diameter diam(∆) = max j∈1,k (τ j+1 − τ j ) ≤ δ (1) (ε). Then the control law {P 0 w0,h , ε, ∆} of the first player guarantees for the value γ w0,h of approximating quality index (19) the inequality γ w0,h ≤ ρ w0,h (t * , r * (·)) + ζ for any control realization of the second player q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ); and the control law {Q 0 w0,h , ε, ∆} of the second player guarantees for the value γ w0,h of approximating quality index (19) the inequality γ w0,h ≥ ρ w0,h (t * , r * (·)) − ζ for any control realization of the first player p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ).
Note that the uniformness in the parameter w 0 ∈ B(R 0 ) is provided by the corresponding uniformness in properties (B .1)-(B.3) .
Let us describe shortly one of the ways of constructing such optimal strategies P 0 w0,h and Q 0 w0,h . We apply the method of extremal shift to accompanying points (see, e.g., [22, 23] and also [26, 28] ). For simplicity of the notation below, it is convenient to consider the so-called pre-strategies of the players in the approximating game (18), (19) . Namely, by pre-strategies p w0,h and q w0,h of the first and second players, we mean functions
that, for any (t, r(·)) ∈ G 0 h and any s ∈ R n , satisfy the inclusions 
where the minimum and maximum are calculated over the functions r ε (·) such that
and the constant λ h is chosen by the set G 0 h in accordance with property (B.2). Note that the minimum and maximum are attained due to continuity of the value function G 0 h ∋ (t * , r * (·)) → ρ w0,h (t * , r * (·)) ∈ R. After that, we define
Remark 2 There are another methods for constructing the optimal positional strategies P 0 w0,h and Q 0 w0,h (see, e.g., [25, 26, 27, 28] ). For example, if the value function ρ w0,h is coinvariantly smooth, then the method of extremal shift in the direction of the coinvariant gradient of ρ w0,h can be applied. In the general non-smooth case, such strategies can be constructed by the extremal shift in direction of the coinvariant gradient of a suitable coinvariantly smooth auxiliary function. Also, one can use the methods based on the notions of maximal u-and v-stable bridges. Furthermore, there are some specific methods for constructing the optimal strategies in the linear case (see, e.g., [13, 32] ).
Players' Control Procedures with a Guide
In this section, we propose the players' feedback control procedures that use the optimally controlled approximating system (18) as a guide. It allows us to show that the values of the approximating differential games (18), (19) have the limit when h ↓ 0. This fact constitutes the basis of the proof of the main result of the paper formulated in Theorem 1 (see Sect. 7).
Mutual Aiming Procedures between the Systems
According to [12, Sect. 7] , let us consider the following mutual aiming procedure between original (5) and approximating (18) systems. First of all, let us introduce pre-strategies of the players in the original game (5), (9) . By pre-strategies u and v of the first and second players, we mean functions
that, for any t ∈ [t 0 , ϑ] and any x, s ∈ R n , satisfy the inclusions
Further, for (t, w(·)) ∈ G * and (t, r(·)) ∈ G 0 h , let us denote
Let (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * be an initial position of original system (5). Let us fix h > 0, put w 0 = w * (t 0 ), and consider the corresponding approximating system (18) under the initial position (t * , r * (·)) defined by (20) . Let us fix also a partition ∆ (21). Let a first player's control realization u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) in the original system and a second player's control realization q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) in the approximating system be formed simultaneously according to the following step-by-step feedback rule:
where
and q w0,h is a pre-strategy of the second player in the approximating game.
Lemma 2 For any ξ > 0, there exist h (2) = h (2) (ξ) > 0 and δ (2) = δ (2) (ξ) > 0 such that, for any initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * of original system (5) and any partition ∆ (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ (2) , the following statement is valid. Let us consider approximating system (18) for w 0 = w * (t 0 ) and h ∈ (0, h (2) ] under the initial position (t * , r * (·)) defined by (20) . Then, for any control realizations v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) and p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ), if control realizations u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) are formed according to the mutual aiming procedure (24), (25) , then the corresponding motions x(·) and y(·) of the original and approximating systems satisfy the inequality
The lemma is proved by the scheme from [12, Theorem 3] , if we take into account that the constants R 1 and H 1 in Corollary 1 and the constant L 1 in Proposition 3 do not depend on an initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * .
Similarly, one can consider another mutual aiming procedure between the original and approximating systems. Namely, let v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) and p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) be formed on the basis of the partition ∆ as follows:
By analogy with Lemma 2, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 For any ξ > 0, there exist h (3) = h (3) (ξ) > 0 and δ (3) = δ (3) (ξ) > 0 such that, for any initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * of original system (5) and any partition ∆ (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ (3) , the following statement is valid. Let us consider approximating system (18) for w 0 = w * (t 0 ) and h ∈ (0, h (3) ] under the initial position (t * , r * (·)) defined by (20) . Then, for any realizations u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ), if realizations v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) and p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) are formed according to the mutual aiming procedure (27), (28) , then the corresponding motions x(·) and y(·) of the original and approximating systems satisfy inequality (26).
First Player's Control Procedure with a Guide
Let (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , h > 0, ε > 0, and a partition ∆ (21) be fixed. We propose the following control procedure of the first player in the original differential game (5), (9) . Let us consider the approximating differential game (18) , (19) for w 0 = w * (t 0 ), the fixed h, and with the initial position (t * , r * (·)) defined by (20) . By the steps of the partition ∆, the first player forms a control realization u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) in the original system and, at the same time, control realizations p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) in the approximating system as follows: u(·) and q(·) are formed according to the mutual aiming procedure (24) , (25) , and p(·) is formed by the control law {P 0 w0,h , ε, ∆} (see (22) ) on the basis of the optimal strategy P 0 w0,h taken from Lemma 1. Note that, from the initial position (t * , w * (·)), the described control procedure together with v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) uniquely generate the motion x(·) of the original system and, therefore, determine the value γ of quality index (9) . Moreover, during this control procedure, the first player generates the auxiliary motion y(·) of the approximating system, which can be considered as a guide (see, e.g., [25, § 8.2] ). For convenience, in what follows, the described control procedure is referred as U (t * , w * (·), h, ε, ∆).
For any h > 0, let us introduce the function
where r * (·) is defined according to (20) , and ρ w0,h (t * , r * (·)) is the value of the approximating differential game (18), (19) for w 0 = w * (t 0 ) and the fixed h.
Lemma 4
For any ζ > 0, there exist
, and any partition ∆ (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ (4) (ε, h), the first player's control procedure with a guide U (t * , w * (·), h, ε, ∆) guarantees for the value γ of quality index (9) the inequality γ ≤ ρ h (t * , w * (·)) + ζ for any control realization of the second player v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ).
Proof Applying [12, Proposition 7] , by the constant L 1 from Proposition 3, one can choose R 2 > 0 and H 2 > 0 such that the inequalities
are valid for any h > 0 and any
Taking the constants R 1 and H 1 from Corollary 1, we define R 3 = max{R 1 , R 0 + R 2 }, H 3 = max{H 1 , H 2 }, and consider the compact set D ⊂ C([t 0 , ϑ], R n ) consisting of the functions x(·) such that
Let ζ > 0 be fixed. Due to (A.5), there exists ξ = ξ(ζ) > 0 such that, for any
Let us choose h (2) (ξ) > 0 and δ (2) (ξ) > 0 by Lemma 2, and put h (4) = h (2) (ξ). Finally, for any h ∈ (0, h (4) ], we take ε (1) (h, ζ/2) > 0 and
, from Lemma 1, and define
Let us show that the statement of the lemma is valid for the chosen parameters.
, and let ∆ be a partition (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ (4) (ε, h). Let us consider the motion x(·) of system (5) generated from the initial position (t * , w * (·)) by the first player's control procedure with a guide U = U (t * , w * (·), h, ε, ∆) and a second player's control realization v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ). Let us consider the corresponding first player's control realization u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) in the original system and players' control realizations p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) in the approximating system (18) for w 0 = w * (t 0 ), the fixed h, and with the initial position (t * , r * (·)) defined by (20) . Let y(·) be the corresponding motion of the approximating system. By the definition of U, the motion y(·) is generated by the control law {P 0 w0,h , ε, ∆} on the basis of the first player's optimal positional strategy P 0 w0,h . Hence, for the auxiliary function
, ϑ], due to the choice of ε and ∆, we obtain
Moreover, the control realizations u(·) and q(·) are formed according to the mutual aiming procedure (24), (25) . Therefore, according to the choice of h and ∆, we derive x(·) − x ′ (·) ∞ ≤ ξ. Thus, taking into account the inclusions x(·), x ′ (·) ∈ D, by the choice of ξ, we have
The lemma is proved.
Second Player's Control Procedure with a Guide
Similarly to Sect. 6.2, we propose the following second player's control procedure with a guide in the original differential game (5), (9) . Let (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , h > 0, ε > 0, and a partition ∆ (21) be fixed. Let us consider the approximating differential game (18) , (19) for w 0 = w * (t 0 ), the fixed h, and with the initial position (t * , r * (·)) defined by (20) . By the steps of the partition ∆, the second player forms a control realization v(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) in the original system and, at the same time, control realizations p(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t * , ϑ) in the approximating system as follows: v(·) and p(·) are formed according to the mutual aiming procedure (27) , (28) , and q(·) is formed by the control law {Q 0 w0,h , ε, ∆} (see (23) ) on the basis of the optimal strategy Q 0 w0,h taken from Lemma 1. From the initial position (t * , w * (·)), the described control procedure together with u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ) uniquely generate the motion x(·) of the original system and determine the value γ of quality index (9) . In what follows, this control procedure with a guide is referred as V (t * , w * (·), h, ε, ∆).
By analogy with Lemma 4, on the basis of Lemma 3, the following result can be proved.
Lemma 5 For any ζ > 0, there exist
such that, for any (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , h ∈ (0, h (5) ], ε ∈ (0, ε (5) (h)], and any partition ∆ (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ (5) (ε, h), the second player's control procedure with a guide V (t * , w * (·), h, ε, ∆) guarantees for the value γ of quality index (9) the inequality γ ≥ ρ h (t * , w * (·)) − ζ for any control realization of the first player u(·) ∈ U(t * , ϑ).
Limit of the Values of the Approximating Games
Considering in the original differential game (5), (9) the case when the both players use the described in Sect. 6.2 and 6.3 control procedures with a guide, we obtain the result below.
Lemma 6 For any initial position (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , the following limit exists: lim h↓0 ρ h (t * , w * (·)) = ρ (t * , w * (·)), (30) where ρ h (t * , w * (·)) is defined by (29) . Moreover, the convergence is uniform in (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * .
Proof By the Cauchy criterion, to prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that, for any ζ > 0, there exists h = h(ζ) > 0 such that, for any h 1 , h 2 ∈ (0, h] and any (t * , w * (·)) ∈ G * , the inequality below is valid:
ρ h2 (t * , w * (·)) ≤ ρ h1 (t * , w * (·)) + ζ.
Let ζ > 0 be fixed. By Lemmas 4 and 5, for i ∈ {4, 5}, let us choose
and put h = min{hwherefrom we obtain ρ (t * , w * (·)) ≤ ρ (u) (t * , w * (·)) + 2ζ * /3.
The obtained inequality contradicts (36) since ζ * > 0. Hence, we derive ρ (u) (t * , w * (·)) = ρ (t * , w * (·)).
The validity of the equality ρ (v) (t * , w * (·)) = ρ (t * , w * (·)) can be established in a similar way. Thus, the first and second parts of the theorem are proved. Inequality (33) in the third part of the theorem follows directly from (35) and (37) . The validity of inequality (34) can be shown similarly. The theorem is proved.
Remark 3 Let us note that, following [25, § 8.2 ] (see also [30] for details), one can consider another formalization of the differential game (5), (9) . Namely, one can formally describe a sufficiently wide classes of players' strategies with a guide and introduce the corresponding values of the players' optimal guaranteed results. One can show that from Theorem 1 it follows that these optimal guaranteed results coincide, i.e., the differential game has the value in the classes of strategies with a guide, and this value is equal to ρ(t * , w * (·)). Moreover, the players' strategies with a guide that guarantee inequalities (33) and (34) can be constructed on the basis of the proposed in Sects. 6.2 and 6.3 control procedures. In this sense, these control procedures with a guide can be called optimal.
Remark 4 In addition to Remark 2, another possible way of solving the approximating differential game (18) , (19) is to approximate functional differential equation of a retarded type (18) by a high-dimensional system of ordinary differential equations (see, e.g., [31] and the references therein). Note that this approach can also be used for proving the existence of the game value and constructing the players' optimal control procedures with a guide in the original differential game (5), (9).
Conclusion
In the paper, we have considered a zero-sum differential game in a dynamical system which motion is described by a fractional differential equation. We have proved that the lower and upper game values coincide, i.e., the differential game has the value. The proof is based on the appropriate approximation of the game by a differential game in a dynamical system which motion is described by a first order functional differential equation of a retarded type. This approach has also allowed us to propose the optimal players' feedback control procedures with a guide, which can be effectively applied if the optimal in the approximating game players' positional strategies are found.
